

TAB

SECRET

*File
MAG
EWP*


14 December 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comments on the MAG Feedback Paper

1. It is recognized that feedback is an important mechanism for the evaluation of Agency performance. Regarding inputs from the ultimate consumers of the information it would appear that this activity is one of paramount concern to the appropriate National Intelligence Officer. Therefore, that while feedback may have been deficient in the past, it now appears likely that the situation will improve because of the existence of the NIOs. The big question arises as to what form this feedback will take. The MAG paper implies a mechanistic, highly formal approach which may be doomed to failure simply because the high level consumer is not inclined to sit down and grade in any formal way the intelligence support that he receives.

2. The Publications Source Survey (PSS) data referred to in the Study is ours. For the past several years, annual reports have been prepared and disseminated to the front offices in the Agency. During the year the data base is used to provide information to both production and collection offices. In the case of the DDO, they work quite extensively with us on the exploitation of the PSS data. It is assumed that a member of the MAG heard about it through one of these means and decided that since it was a viable data base it might be made more useable to management. However, and before any changes are made in its content and format, we should look carefully at what we intend for this rather simple system for cataloguing and recording value judgments on the collection programs used in our finished intelligence production effort. Clear guidelines will have to be established that will



SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000900010003-2

structure the input and aid in the evaluation of the output if this project is expanded into the community.

3. My greatest concern about the MAG paper concerns what has been called "actionable items." I assume that this term is being used to isolate certain kinds of reporting from the finished intelligence that we have identified for inclusion in the PSS. Therefore, the actionable reporting must include typescript or highly sensitive DDO/FIRS. This reporting probably is developed by request from department heads or the NSC, by the DCI who feels that an event, situation or circumstance ought to be expeditiously reported via typescript or by the selection of hot DDO reports that are deemed germane to a current crisis situation. Here again, it is doubtful that any ultimate consumer would be willing or in fact be able to sit down and provide feedback because (1) he may not have all the pieces to permit feedback; and (2) he may not have the time to do so even if he were so inclined.

4. ~~The MAG memo in one respect seems to be more directed toward management of collection systems but, on careful reading, it also appears to relate equally strongly to production.~~ In the production context, the proposal seems to be suggesting that the quality of the finished product can be improved through feedback from the consumer and that a secondary result of this feedback will be to improve upon the various collection programs needed to develop the finished intelligence product. In other words, it is very difficult to isolate these two aspects of the intelligence process within the context of the MAG Study.

5. The other two items mentioned in the Study have been looked at periodically and at present are of concern to the Human Source Committee, that is, forward planning as we see it from the collection guidance point of view and identification of marginal collection programs and efforts. The HSC has several projects under way that will result in recommendations for improvement on these two matters. It is doubtful that similar problems exist in the SIGINT and the RECCE world. They may exist in the DDO and this is a question that could be addressed by that organization.

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000900010003-2

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000900010003-2

6. The MAG Study identifies some of the managerial activities that are under consideration. There are others that relate to the problems stated. The tools that the DCI has at hand to help him manage are the NIOs, IC Staffers, objectives, DCID 1/2, USIB committees. All reflect upon management of community collection and production resources. The virtue of the MAG paper may be that by drawing attention to several problems at this time, it may in effect accelerate efforts toward their solution.



25X1

Assistant for Programs Guidance
DDI/Information Requirements Staff

SECRET

DATE: 12.20.73

TO: Mr. Proctor

FROM:

SUBJECT: The Definitive Word on
"Actionable Intelligence"

REMARKS:

My MAG informant tells me that lots of others have had trouble with this term. In DDO parlance, actionable intelligence is that which a Station reports back to Headquarters intended for passage to other agencies. These agencies are expected to take some action on the basis of the intelligence they have received from CIA. For example, if the COS/Beirut reports that possible BSO types have applied for visas to the U.S., "actionable intelligence" is sent to the Department and possibly the FBI for appropriate action.

What the author apparently means by "actionable intelligence" is what we would call "warning intelligence."

C
U
R
R
E
N
T


I
N
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

Attached are some thoughts

have on the
MAG paper on "feedback".



25X1

17 December 1973
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)